Лев и дракон: новый этап китайско-иранского стратегического партнёрства

In January 2016, during Xi Jinping's visit to Iran, the Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a US $ 4.8 billion natural gas development project, 30% of which it will control along with two other partners [44]. At the end of December 2018, the state-owned Chinese corporation Sinopec announced its readiness to invest US $ 3 billion in the development of an Iranian oil field. The deal was part of an existing contract for the exploitation of the Yadavaran field (the Yadavaran contract was signed back in 2007), located in southwestern Iran near the Iraqi border, which has reserves of 5.7 bln barrels of oil. Washington allowed Beijing to buy 360,000 barrels of Iranian oil daily. Earlier, CNPC received the consent of the White House to invest in the North Azadegan and Masjid-i-Suleiman oil fields in exchange for freezing investments in Iran's largest gas field, South Pars (which is the world’s largest and shared with Qatar): CNPC replaced Total with South Pars "after the French company left Iran due to the restoration of U.S. sanctions. CNPC put into operation the first phase of North Azadegan with production of 75,000 barrels per day in November 2016 [26]. In August 2019, China “reengaged” in the development of the Jask oil terminal, which sits east of the Strait of Hormuz [32].

Thus, Iran will become one of the main sources of energy supplies for China. However, experts believe that such a project contradicts the current policy of official Beijing, but with increasing American pressure it becomes more and more attractive for the Chinese authorities [7]. The inclusion of such a strategically and geographically significant country like Iran fits into the logic of gaining wider `access` to the oil-rich ME, where six states in the `region` are integral members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and have historically been allied with the U.S. because of their political, economic and strategic interests. For China, the need to offset U.S. economic interests in the Persian Gulf requires more states to participate in Chinese NSR, with Iran as an important stakeholder given its geographic proximity to the `region` and its uneasy relationship with the U.S. [50]. It is believed that China's NSR could facilitate international access to Iran's gas, oil and mineral deposits [43].

A Military Component of the Deal. One of a feature of the Iranian-Chinese military-technical cooperation is the fact that Beijing not only supplies ready-made weapons, but transfers a number of technologies to Iran, assists in the creation of its military-industrial complex capable of producing tactical and operational-tactical missiles, artillery systems, warships and boats [9, c. 246]. The Iranian leadership views China as one of the leading partners in military and military-technical cooperation aimed at strengthening Iran's conventional weapons and military equipment, in particular in the field of cyber weapons. After the lifting of sanctions against Iran in 2016 (in accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA), it purchased 150 Chengdu J-10 fighters from China for US $ 1 billion [16].

The new agreement includes as well China's plans to develop several ports in Iran, which will provide the Chinese side with the island of Kish or the strategically important port of Bandar-e-Jask for a long-term lease [18] and will give the green light for the deployment of 5,000 Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) servicemen on Iranian territory (some of them in the Persian Gulf region) with the possibility of increasing the number of personnel to guard and ensure the safety of the transit of oil, gas and petrochemical products to China. Renting a port opens up wide opportunities for China to project its naval power in the Persian Gulf [16]. A separate article provides for the joint creation of the latest weapons and plans to help Iran in the creation of ballistic missiles [17].

However, another element has now been added to this deal that could change the geopolitical balance in the ME. In early July 2020, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei agreed to expand the existing deal to include new military elements proposed by senior officials in the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and intelligence agencies [75]. Iranian sources have revealed some of the top-secret military elements of the agreement, which cover "full air and naval cooperation between Iran and China", with Russia playing a key role [56]. Following a planned Iranian-Sino-Russian meeting in August 2020, the Chinese and Russian Air Forces: bombers, fighters and transport aircraft will have unlimited access to Iranian airbases, and specialized dual-use facilities6 recently built by Chinese companies near existing airports in Chabahar, Bandar-e-Bushehr and Bandar Abbas will be able to be used by Chinese and Russian ships from November 9, 2020. The electronic component will include all 3 key areas of Electronic Warfare (EW): electronic support (including early warning about the use of enemy weapons), electronic attack (including jamming systems) and electronic protection (including jamming the enemy). The goal of electronic warfare is to neutralize NATO C4ISR systems (command, control, communications, computers, surveillance and reconnaissance). The S-400 complexes will be involved to counter attacks by the U.S. and Israel [14]. It is supposed to link the Iranian air defense with the 19th brigade of the Russian Air Force (Rassvet) near Rostov-on-Don, which is already connected with the Chinese air defense. One of the Russian air jamming systems will be based in Chabahar and will be able to completely disable the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia's air defenses, provided they only have about 2 minutes of warning of a missile or unmanned attack [75].

Investments in the transport and industrial infrastructure of Iran. Under the agreement of 2020, in the next five years, it is planned to invest another US $ 120 billion already in the transport and industrial infrastructure of Iran [7]. Almost 100 joint Sino-Iranian projects will be included in the B&R megaproject. Airports, high-speed railways, seaports, bridges, ports, roads and other infrastructure facilities will be built here. The PRC will develop FTZ in Maku in northern Iran, in Abadan (where the Shatt al-Arab flows into the Persian Gulf) and on the Qeshm island in the Gulf itself [17]. The development of the South-North corridor (Chabahar-Central Asia), the South-West corridor (Chabahar and Bandar Abbas-Turkey and Azerbaijan) and the Pakistan-Iran-Iraq-Syria "pilgrimage railway" are some notable initiatives [74].