Лев и дракон: новый этап китайско-иранского стратегического партнёрства

2. IRAN'S SIGNIFICANCE IN THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

2.1 Iran as a Part of the Belt and Road Initiative

New Silk Road (NSR) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is set to take 10-15 years and US $ 1 trillion to connect China to global markets through a vast array of land (Economic Belt of Silk Road/EBSR) and sea (Maritime Silk Road of 21st Century/MSR) trade routes across Eurasia. Originally announced in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping with the goal of restoring the ancient Silk Road linking Asia and Europe, the scope of the BRI has expanded over time to include new territories and development initiatives. This project envisages the construction of a large network of roads, railways, seaports, electric networks, oil and gas pipelines, and related infrastructure projects [31].

BRI was warmly welcomed from the outset by Tehran. As one of the founders of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the IRI joined the bank on April 7, 2014 as the 34th member [54]. After talks on 23 January 2016, in Tehran with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Iran and China agreed to expand bilateral relations and increase trade to US $ 600 billion over the next 10 years and agreed on forming strategic relations [as] reflected in a 25-year comprehensive document [55]. Relying on their respective strengths and advantages as well as the opportunities provided through the signing of documents such as the “MOU on Jointly Promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and “MOU on Reinforcement of Industrial and Mineral Capacities and Investment” [49]. Thus, Iran expressed its readiness to participate in both parts of China's NSR project - the EBSR and the MSR trade routes - which could serve Iran's political, geostrategic, security and economic interests at a regional level [71]. 17 agreements were signed to expand cooperation and mutual investments in various areas including communications, railway, ports, energy, industry, commerce and services, finance, telecommunications [16].

After meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese authorities support Iran's application for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after the lifting of the United ations (UN) sanctions that impeded it. The parties agreed to strengthen cooperation in the exchange of intelligence information and the joint fight against regional threats, terrorism and extremism [5]. According to the ideologues of Iran, the inclusion of leading Islamic countries (Iran, as well as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc.) in the SCO will allow uniting the efforts of five non-Western civilizations - Russian, Chinese, Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist in search of a new world on the basis of "fair globalization”. At the same time, Iran sharply distinguishes itself both from the West (US, EU) and from the East (Russia, India, China), offering the whole world an Islamic identity based on the Iranian-Islamic (Shiite) civilization [25, c. 28]. It is no coincidence that Chinese and Central Asian leaders view Iran as a security partner because Iran, with its Shiite majority population, poses no threat in terms of exporting radical Islam, and its Islamist ideas have limited appeal in Central Asian states with a Sunni majority or among the Muslim minority of China, which historically fears the role of Sunni-majority states [31].

It is worth noting that at the SCO summit in Ufa in July 2015, the heads of the SCO member states and the organization's observers, among whom were Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Hassan Rouhani, highlighted the prospects of the initiative to form a single SCO transport system and discussed at an expanded meeting plans to link the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and EBSR [51, p. 107; 33]. The expansion of the EAEU is one of the most important ways to develop integration in the territory of the former SU with the prospect of creating various free trade zones (FTZ) of the EAEU with countries that are not part of it. And an important role in this process can be played by the current relations between the EAEU and the countries of the ME, primarily with Iran, a temporary agreement on a FTZ with which came into force in October 27, 2019 [1]. The agreement provides for limited product coverage, but includes almost all major tradable products, which account for 55% of total EAEU exports [4].2 The EAEU has reduced import duties for Iran on more than 500 items [1].3

In August 2019, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif visited his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and presented a roadmap to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between Iran and China, signed in 2016 year [7].4 It was then that secret provisions were added to the document, which include a number of privileges for China [16].

However, the agreement was stalled by Trump's destruction of the nuclear deal and a campaign of colossal pressure on China, which was forced to slow down the momentum of the Iranian-Chinese cooperation, which was gaining strength and again put tanker oil deals into the shadows [24]. Iran struck a nuclear deal with the so-called P5+1 in 2015, which involves the waiving of sanctions in return for curbing nuclear enrichment activities [50].