Лев и дракон: новый этап китайско-иранского стратегического партнёрства

3.2 The India-China Competition Over the Port of Chabahar

A significant role in the rapprochement of the countries of Central Eurasia with Iran, in particular with India and Iran, was played by the latter's consistent striving to become one of the regional centers of energy trade (oil and gas) and transport and energy integration (gas pipeline, INSTC) [25, с. 19]. Iran, together with India and Russia, is pushing forward the sea and rail corridor, which is based on the agreement concluded with Russia and India to create the INSTC. It would link Jawaharlal Nehru Port, India’s largest container port east of Mumbai, through the Iranian deep-sea port of Chabahar (in southeastern Iran, on the Gulf of Oman), and its Caspian Sea port of Bandar-e-Anzali to Russia’s Volga River harbour of Astrakhan and onwards by rail to Europe. The route would reduce travel distance by from 40 days through the Suez Canal to somewhere between 25 and 28 days and cost by 30%. It takes only 19 days for a container shipped from India through the Suez Canal to reach the German port city of Hamburg. If successful, the corridor could challenge the supremacy of the Suez Canal and complement it with China's BRI, and give Iran a significant advantage in the rivalry with Saudi Arabia and the UAE played in CA, which are also key players in Russian and Chinese ploys for dominance in the ME. INSTC also would strengthen Iran’s position as a key node in the B&R on the back of a rail `link` between western China and Tehran that runs across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan [62]. The competing plans for these ports on the Gulf of Oman highlight both the competition between China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and INSTC, and the broader geopolitical competition in South Asia between India and China [77, p. 17]. However, Russian expert V. Yurtaev believed that the materialized factor of "triple accord" of India, Iran and Russia, due to objective circumstances, was able to restrain China's geo-economic and geopolitical expansion in Central Eurasia [25, с. 19].

India, in contrast to China's construction of the neighboring Pakistani port of Gwadar, is actively involved in the development of Chabahar, also pursuing the goal of having land `access` to Afghanistan and playing a more important role in trade and security of Afghanistan and CA [79]. Indian consulting company IRCON has pledged to provide all services and funding for the Chabahar port project, which is estimated at approximately US $ 1.6 billion [27],14 and approved a US $ 150 million development plan to begin building up the investment zone stipulated by the initial agreement in May, 2016. However, Pakistan has established a transit blockade for Indian goods going to Iran and beyond. Afghanistan responded by banning Pakistani freight transit through its territory, which was a bad sign of growing hopes for regional rail links between Tajikistan and Pakistan via Afghanistan [69].

The Chabahar port development project includes five phases. Only one phase has been developed with the participation of India. Iran invited other countries like Australia and Japan to invest in the port, while India was working there [52]. Japan is also considered a potential investor in Chabahar to strengthen ties with the 80 million Iranian market, and to turn the territory of Iran and the port of Chabahar into an important channel for more cost-effective `access` to CA and Afghanistan [31]. After completion of missing links construction in the path on the borders with Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran will turn into the main corridor for the delivery of goods to these countries [21].

At stake is also container trade along the China-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey line, the hub of which is the port of Bandar Abbas in Iranian Baluchistan [20]. The construction carried out by a subsidiary of the CNPC (pending the lifting/or easing of U.S. and United Nations sanctions against Iran as a result of an international agreement limiting the Islamic Republic's nuclear program) was to include an already partially constructed link between Iran and Pakistan. But the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the resumption of sanctions froze the pipeline project. However, in 2019, Pakistan and Iran, in order to revive the project, agreed that Iran, having completed its section of communication between the two countries, would withdraw from the arbitration procedures, which forced Pakistan to pay a fine for not fulfilling its part of the deal. According to the agreement, Pakistan must complete the construction of the pipeline section by 2024 [61].