Лев и дракон: новый этап китайско-иранского стратегического партнёрства

A strategic partnership with Iran is not entirely safe for China, as continued trade with Iran, investment in the country's infrastructure, and deepening ties could cause discontent in the United States. It could expose Beijing to sanctions and the risk of losing some access to the U.S. market (which is much larger than the Iranian market), as well as disrupting their regional partnerships with Israel or Saudi Arabia, each of which is currently engaged in proxy wars and covert operations. against Iran [79]. Regarding to Sini-Iranian oil contract, although Iranian oil supplies to China hit a 20-year low in March 2020, reflecting a drop-in demand amid the coronavirus pandemic, China's oil imports from Russia and Saudi Arabia have not declined. In addition, a trade agreement signed between the U.S. and China earlier this year could provide for the export of US $ 50 billion in oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal from the U.S. to China, strengthening the Washington's role in China's energy security and competition, since Beijing is unlikely to sacrifice its U.S. trade market to trade with Iran [45]. Under the pressure of U.S. sanctions and the demand sagging due to the coronavirus, imports of Iranian oil to China decreased from 630 thousand barrels in 2017 to 100-200 thousand barrels in 2020. But even for China, US $ 280 billion is a fairly large amount. Moreover, Iran remains a risky investment, as it is under sanctions, because of which China can buy oil and gas facilities cheaply, since there are no more willing ones [7].

By the way, some Chinese companies have already `paid` a huge price for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and cut their ties with Iran prior to the pandemic to avoid violating U.S. sanctions, which the Trump administration has been tightening against Tehran since May 2018. Avoiding secondary U.S. sanctions on Iran-related businesses has allowed these companies to retain their `access` to the much more lucrative U.S. market [66]. Thus, the state company CNPC, which planned to participate in the development of the 11th stage of the South Pars field, withdrew from the deal, and the China National Machinery Import and Export Company did not complete the electrification of the Tehran-Mashdad high-speed railway under a US $ 2.4 billion contract [7]. CNPC withdrew from a US $ 5 billion natural gas project in Iran last year due to difficulties in finding banking channels to transfer funds to Iran. The U.S. also sanctioned the Chinese company Zhuhai Zhenrong last year for transporting Iranian oil. Since the coronavirus pandemic began, anti-Chinese sentiment in Iran has risen [6]. In 2017, ZTE, the giant Chinese telecommunications company, was fined US $ 1.19 billion for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea. In 2018, Huawei's CFO Meng Wanzhou was detained in Canada for violating sanctions against Iran [74].

Implications for Tehran. The strategic rapprochement between Tehran and Beijing causes discontent among many in Iran, both among representatives of the reformist camp and among radical conservatives. Critics of the agreement include former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well as the son of the last Iranian monarch, Reza Pahlavi, who lives abroad. The reason for such hypotheses was the peculiar debt policy of the PRC, which, as is commonly believed in the research environment, inevitably entails Beijing's encroachment on the military and economic sovereignty of its debtors [18]. M. Ahmadinejad even stated that it is unacceptable to conclude a secret agreement with foreign parties without taking into account the will of the Iranian people and contrary to the interests of the country and the nation. Prince Reza Pahlavi, criticizing the authorities in Tehran, `said` that agreements with China could lead not only to the loss of control over natural resources, but also to the emergence of a Chinese army in Iran. Some analysts are convinced that the top Iranian elite, dominated by the IRGC and religious foundations closely related to it, are interested in a strategic financial, economic and military alliance with China. Indeed, oil and gas, infrastructure, the military component - that is, those areas that are declared as objects of investment and cooperation, are almost completely controlled by the IRGC [16].