Стратегия «жемчужной нити» как мера для реализации инициативы китайского морского шелкового пути

In fact, the Indian Ocean is considered the main `region` for preparing the PLA navy and provides the conditions for navigation and operation in the deep-sea `region`, which gives the PLAN an excellent opportunity to practice the escort and defense of the Chinese commercial fleet [Payette, Sun, 2017, P. 5]. A recent announcement by the Chinese government about the reduction of the PLA with the calculation of an increase in the size of the Marine Corps from 20,000 to 1,000,000 indicates a tectonic shift in its focus from protecting the periphery of China to protecting the naval forces. Some of these buildings will be located at facilities operating in China, in Djibouti and Gwadar [Tsering, 2018, P. 70]. China’s military exchanges between Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sudan, the Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, and others, have laid a foundation for further military cooperation in the western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf [Degang, 2015].

However, it would take the PLA Navy many years to bring into operation a full-fledged Carrier Task Force, and possibly decades to make it effective enough to achieve sea-control against advanced navies. Meanwhile, this process can deliver an indelible blow to China’s goal of promoting a “soft” and “constructive” `image` in the Indo-Pacific `region` (IPR), including through its MSR [Khurana, 2018b, P. 177]. It is nothing more than an attempt to restructure the strategy of the “String of Pearls” in harmless soft terms [Chellaney, 2015b].

For comparison, on the MSR, special attention is `paid` to infrastructure programs that will stimulate economic growth and development along their path and `link` the component of the “road” with the component of the land-based “belt”. To achieve this, the roadmap requires coordination of policies, expansion of ties in transport (both water- and land-based) and energy infrastructure, as well as the removal of trade barriers. Commonalities between “String of Pearls” theory and the MSR include:

Deepening relationships with `target` countries;
Focusing on strategic waterways in the Indo-Pacific;
Developing infrastructure in `target` areas;
Sustaining and encouraging economic growth;
Safeguarding and enhancing China’s energy security [Drun, 2017].

China’s defense guidance tasks the PLA with playing a more prominent role in Beijing’s new military diplomacy and national security strategy, a further shift away from “keeping a low profile.” The PLA Navy’s participation in international counterpiracy patrols in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, China’s first naval deployment outside Asia, is one example of the PLA’s recalibrated engagement [Nantulya, 2019]. In the eyes of foreign observers, the most striking illustration of China's global ambitions was the sending of Chinese ships to the shores of Somalia to fight pirates in 2008 - the first in 500 years China’s participation in a naval campaign outside its territorial waters [Ли, 2011, C. 163]. Between December 2008 and August 2018, China sent 30 naval escort task forces to Somalia in the international anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. More recently, Beijing also conducted mass evacuations of Chinese and foreign nationals from Libya and Yemen [Gaoyuem, Charm, 2019, P. 5-6].

May assume that a naval presence in Africa will give China greater latitude to support its peacekeeping troops, humanitarian interests, and hard security operations. Together, these deployments form part of a diverse set of deployments that the PLA calls “new historical missions” [Nantulya, 2019].