Стратегия «жемчужной нити» как мера для реализации инициативы китайского морского шелкового пути

Chinese Strategy of Maritime “String of Pearls”

Beijing has begun work on projects for the “Dual Use Logistics Facility”, which should make up the "String of Pearls", at the end of the 20th century and continues to this day. The “Dual Use Logistics Facility” is characterized by its light footprint, its emphasis on providing logistics support to overseas non-traditional security missions, and its dual commercial and military nature. The “String of Pearls” model is similar to the “Dual Use Logistics Facility” except that it would include secret `access` agreements and covert development of commercial facilities to support later military use, with the ultimate objective of being able to support major combat operations against India and to dominate the IOR [Yung, 2015].

According to Christina Lin, several elements are needed to carry out “String of Pearls” strategy:

Gaining `access` to airfields and ports through the construction of new facilities (sometimes with significant subsidies for construction, given that they will be provided if necessary) or the establishment of cordial relations with countries that already have key facilities.

Expanding diplomatic relations, so that airspace and shipping lanes remain free and are often accompanied by mutually beneficial trade and export agreements. Since securing a “String of Pearls” depends on `linking` a number of dissimilar places, it is important to ensure that each pearl is safe from any potential threats from neighboring states.

Modernization of the armed forces for an effective movement to maintain individual pearls, if necessary, as well as in preparation for appropriate actions and exercises [Lin, 2011, P. 10].

The theory for the Chinese “String of Pearls” is related to Beijing’s need for geostrategic security of the “Choke Points” and maritime [oil and trade] routes critical to its development] [Bozhev, 2019]. The “String of Pearls” strategy is designed to build infrastructure projects covering the Chinese SLOCs [Кувалдин, 2015], and based on China’s need to establish an increased level of influence and advanced presence on the sea routes through the use of investment, port development, economic, political, diplomatic and military means [Devonshire-Ellis, 2009]. Dai Xu, a former PLA Air Force colonel, argued in 2009 that to effectively fulfill its international responsibilities and build a good `image`, China “needs sufficient power to protect world peace”. Fulfilling this obligation requires a special supply facility for the provision of support” [Yung, Rustici, Devary, Lin, 2014, P. 14].

Worth to note, that China has never officially used the term “String of Pearls” strategy in relation to the Chinese network of marine facilities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans [Кувалдин, 2015]. The term was coined in 2005, when the U.S. consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) published the “Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report”, predicting that China would try to expand its naval presence throughout the IOR by building maritime civilian infrastructure in friendly states in the `region`, a strategy dubbed the “String of Pearls” [Baker, 2015]. The authors argued that if China needed to protect its flow of energy through the Indian Ocean, it could build on its existing commercial and security relationships to establish a string of military facilities in South Asia. The analysis in the BAH study has come to be accepted in some Indian and U.S. policy circles as a description of China’s actual strategy for its out of area activities. At the time, China had contributed to construction of naval bases in Burma, funded construction of a new port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and invested in commercial port facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh [Yung, Rustici, Devary, Lin, 2014, P. 14].

Moreover, China’s economic assistance in the aforementioned countries (and Greece), together with investments in overland pipelines, roads and railways through the Caspian `region` (EBSR), is part of the “String of Pearls” military strategy to ensure a free flow of energy and naval-`access` outposts along the great trade arteries in the event of a Taiwan conflict and resultant U.S. naval blockade [Lin, 2011, P. 10]

In essence, the “String of Pearls” strategy is aimed at achieving the goal of obtaining direct `access` to China in the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal, bypassing the Strait of Malacca, which became doubly relevant in connection with the adoption in 2000 of the program for the accelerated development of the southwestern provinces of China - Yunnan, Sichuan etc. The construction of a network of roads and pipelines in these provinces and deep into China from ports in the Indian Ocean, for example, in Myanmar, accelerates and cheapens the delivery of goods and energy resources [Лебедева, 2011].

It is also worth remembering that the “String of Pearls” strategy was developed in part due to the lack of progress on the Kra-Canal project (across the Kra isthmus in Southern Thailand), which would allow Chinese vessels to enter the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea [Devonshire-Ellis, 2009], bypassing the Strait of Malacca and Singapore located on its shores. Then the Thai authorities were not ready to delegate national sovereignty to the Chinese, explaining their refusal by the quirks of local legislation that prohibits foreigners from registering land as property [Цатурян, 2016].

Currently China’s investment is spreading from Hainan Island in the South China Sea through the coastal areas of the Strait of Malacca, including port facilities at Malacca (Malaysia), a container port in Chittagong (Bangladesh); Coco, Hianggyi, Sittwe or Kyaukphyu (Myanmar), port of Chauphyu on Ramree Island in the Bay of Bengal (Myanmar), Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun (Myanmar); Laem Chabang (Thailand) and Sihanoukville (Cambodia). They stretch across the Indian Ocean, Colombo and Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Male (Maldives), the port of Gwadar and Pasni (Pakistan), port of Djibouti (Djibouti), Victoria (Seychelles) and the islands within the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf [Храмчихин, 2017; Devonshire-Ellis, 2009]. China has invested as well in ports of Greece, the Netherlands, Singapore, Kenya, Togo [Takes, 2016, P. 7].