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Стратегия «жемчужной нити» как мера для реализации инициативы китайского морского шелкового пути
Sea Lane Safe Communications as a Key to Sustainable Development of the Maritime Silk Road
The Indian Ocean also has an impressive number of shipping lines, also known as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) - sea passages between ports. Given that over 90% of world trade is shipping, these SLOCs have great geopolitical value, since the country that controls them can either open or restrict their `access`. As some of the fastest growing economies are located in Asia, the number of SLOCs in the Indian Ocean is expected to grow over the next few decades. The 13 busiest ports in the world are in Asia, and as production grows, the need for safe transit routes in the Indian Ocean is growing more than ever [EFSAS, 2019, P. 2].
The Indian Ocean as well is home to China’s important SLOCs, thus raising the stakes for China to maintain security and stability in the IOR to avoid any instances of being choked [Jash, 2018, P. 73]. In this sense, China’s strategic and defensive goals for the MSR project are the securing seaports as “outposts”, naval support, route development, supply lines, political and economic ties [Kuo, 2017], as well as definition of the broader geopolitics, maritime order and balance of power in the Asia, ME, Africa and IOR [Chellaney, 2015a].
The most critical interest is China’s energy “life line”, passing through the IOR and, to a large extent, constituting its “strategic vulnerability” from the ban on the part of the U.S. or India. This makes the defense of its SLOC one of the most important functions of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)’s Navy (PLAN) missions in the IOR and reinforces the need for China's continued presence on the naval forces in the IOR [Khurana, 2018a, P. 201]. The PLANs modernization has been merged with the B&R, so that the goals of the two projects can mutually benefit one another [Payette, Sun, 2017, P. 4].
Modern Chinese maritime policy is based on the "Agenda of China on the Seas and Oceans for the 21st Century" (1996) and the "White Paper on the Development of the Marine Economy in China" (1998), which put forward a strategy for the continued development of the country's marine economy and set the following goals:
1. effective protection of the marine rights and interests of the state;
2. rational development and use of marine resources;
3. effective protection of the marine environment;
4. the development of science, technology and education in the field of oceanology;
5. integrated marine management;
6. ensuring the peaceful use, development and protection of the seas and oceans and the resolution of all maritime disputes on an equitable basis [Ли, 2011, C. 162-163].
It is no coincidence, that President Xi Jinping’s vision of the MSR reinforced the PLA’s naval imperative, which adheres to the principle of “flag follows trade”. The 2014 Chinese White Paper on Defense — the first official formulation of China’s military doctrine or strategy, published May 26, 2015 — for the first time explicitly pointed to the PLAN’s task of “open seas protection”. This indicated a shift from the PLA Navy’s doctrine of ‘offshore defense’ to that of ‘offshore defense-cum-open seas protection’ for securing China’s distant interests [Khurana, 2018a, P. 201]. The White Paper says: "... (World) Ocean is the guarantor of China's peaceful existence and sustainable development. The traditional mentality proclaiming the dogma of land over the (World) Ocean should be discarded ... Great importance should be attached to the presence in the (World) Ocean in order to protect communications and the foreign presence of China" [Алиханов, 2017]. That means, developing the ocean fleet, and also solving the problem of the lack of logistics infrastructure, that is, creating a base for the Chinese fleet in the Indian Ocean. White Paper emphasizes that China’s national interests change as China grows — these are now various global factors, such as the threat of international terrorism, global epidemics, or the problem of maritime piracy [Кувалдин, 2015].
Thus, the Chinese military doctrine of MSR illustrates the shift in China's emphasis from continental to maritime strategy, that is, a shift from long-standing attention to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the Indian Ocean, which has become the world's largest and strategically important maritime corridor for the global economy and security. China’s ambitions towards the status of a great power can be achieved by strengthening the dominant role and gaining freedom of navigation in the most important waters of the Indian Ocean, which is catalyzed by the Chinese Dream [Jash, 2018, P. 73]. The goal of the Chinese Dream or Great Dream is the revival and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [Qiu, 2014, P. 108; Harutyunyan, 2018, P. 28-43], which Beijing formulates as "universal harmony in the world" [Hu, 2013, P. 126]. To realize this dream, China needs a peaceful and stable international and peripheral environment, and will realize its dream through persistent endeavors for peaceful development [Yang, 2014, P. 9].
In this context, Beijing’s MSR strategy is of great interest, which focuses on creating Chinese strongholds or “naval posts” with military or geopolitical influence along the Indian Ocean littoral, in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, called a “String of Pearls” - similar to the “Dual Use Logistics Facility” [Lin, 2011, P. 10].
Арутюнян Агавни Александровна, канд. ист. наук, ведущий науч. сотрудник Отдела Международных отношений Института Востоковедения Национальной Академии Наук Армении