Китай - Южный Кавказ: Сотрудничество в транспортно-логистических узлах «Пояса и пути»

Conclusion

After the collapse of the SU, the SC has become one of the hotbeds of international controversy, where the interests of the world's leading powers are increasingly clashing in the struggle to establish control over regional and international communications, transport, infrastructure, fuel and other raw materials. In addition to the largest centers of the multi-centered world - US, EU, Russia and traditional regional players - Turkey and Iran, other states pursuing geopolitical and geo-economic interests, particularly China, actively joined that struggle.

While establishing relations with the newly independent republics of the `region` Beijing applied a "cluster" and not an "individual" partnership approach, pursuing a policy of non-intervention, and used a balanced and proportionate toolkit among the countries of the `region`, emphasizing the expansion of economic activity. Since 2010s, Beijing's political ties are expanding, and its economic role is steadily growing in the SC. In the context of the implementation of the BRI, the region acquires significant geopolitical and geostrategic significance for China as a crossroads connecting the East-West, North-South transport routes and corridors, as well as the Black and Caspian seas and the Persian Gulf.

The transport, communication, infrastructure and investment programs proposed by Beijing were attractive to the countries of the region, as they corresponded to foreign policy ideas about serving the interests of their countries through important regional corridors connecting Europe with Asia. Georgia's national strategy to become a logistics and transport hub coincides with China's initiative to build the EBSR. China has become one of the largest foreign investors in Georgia, which is ready to make full use of its unique geographical location and expand cooperation with China in such areas as railways, ports and road construction. The implementation of major transport projects in the SC, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the Alat FTZ at the Alat International Seaport, TITR, Trans-Caucasus Transit Corridor, Georgian port of Poti (Poti FTZ), Anaklia deep-water port, and Batumi port in Black Sea boosted the region's vitality in becoming a hub for the China-Europe trade route. So, Azerbaijan and Georgia are included in the Middle Corridor initiative due to their location in the TITR.

Armenia can also cooperate with Beijing by incorporating its major road and rail projects into the construction of the B&R transport corridors. As a member of the EEU, taking advantage of the establishment of cooperation between the BRI and the EEU, Yerevan can also contribute to the deepening of cooperation between them. However, it should also be taken into account that Armenia does not have a common border with the EEU countries, while China itself has a common border with the two largest members of the EEU, so it can easily supply its goods to the EEU markets through them. Therefore, in the case of Armenia, closer cooperation with Georgia and Iran will be essential. Although Armenia is not included in the Middle Corridor initiative, as an official B&R country, it has the potential to benefit from Chinese foreign direct investment.

As a result of the research of the China's foreign policy in the SC, we came to the conclusion that although China's growing presence and importance in the `region` cannot be compared with Russia, the West, Iran and Turkey, it is no longer a force that cannot be ignored and should be considered as an important factor. Against the background of the global confrontation between the West and Russia, China is becoming a new major player in the Caucasus-Caspian subregion.

However, there are also a number of obstacles on the way to deepening cooperation. The market of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia is too small for Beijing, so it is more interested in using them mainly as a "window to Europe". China's investment in the region is not large because in the area of lending, including infrastructure, Beijing's strong competitors are multilateral development banks. The most important thing is that for China, the Trans-Caspian transport corridor is not a priority since simpler options for land transit of goods from China to Europe are transit through the territory of Russia or Kazakhstan and Russia.

No less important condition is the preservation of military-political stability in the SC, which has become aggravated in recent years. The problems of the political attitudes and peculiarities of the economic policy of the countries of the SC also restrain China's economic expansion in the region. And although China will try to take advantage of the opportunities that arise in the SC region, it will most likely expect more initiative in this matter from the countries of the region themselves.