Китайский «Один пояс, один путь» в арабских странах северной и восточной Африки

FOCAC is based on five guiding principles and goals set out in the White Paper on China's Af-rica Policy in 2006:

− sincerity, friendship and equality;
− mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity;
− mutual support and close coordination;
− learn from each other and strive for common development [79, p. 29-30].

At the 2006 meeting of the FOCAC, a plan was announced to establish five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa to attract Chinese invest-ment and integrate China's complex economic ac-tivities throughout the continent [91, p. 9]. During the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Confer-ence, held in Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt, November 8-9, 2009), China announced its willingness to invest more in Africa, planning more projects and increas-ing its “no strings attached” (“unconditional”) pres-ence [122]. New areas of cooperation at FOCAC 2018 could include renewables and New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI) [76, p. 1]. 2

China endorsed the New Partnership for Afri-ca’s Development in 2001, Action Plan for Accelerat-ing Industrial Development in Africa in 2007, Africa Infrastructure Development Plan and Africa 2063 Vision in 2013. In 2014, China introduced the “461” China-Africa cooperation Framework, which means:

1. Four Principles including; equality, prag-matism, sincerity, trustworthiness;
2. Six major projects: industry, finance, poverty reduction, environmental protection, cultural exchanges, peace and safety;
3. All under One platform: China-Africa forum [117].

Events during the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the uprising and civil war in Libya, and the mass protests that spread across the Maghrib, Mashrik and down the Arabian Peninsula - created something of a challenge for China [22, p.64-104; 20, p. 105-128]. The fact is that Beijing's economic interests are the most dominant factor in determining its foreign policy towards the coun-tries of the `region`, and it focuses on stability to en-sure continued `access` to natural resources, even without considering Beijing's concerns about the general undesirability of overthrowing govern-ments by mass movements [84, p. 6].

In general, the strategic location of the five Arab countries (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tu-nisia) of NA on the southern Mediterranean coast means that China's presence will only expand, es-pecially in the economic sphere, where Egypt, Mo-rocco and Algeria are the highest priority. While China's relations with Egypt and Algeria are char-acterized by strong diplomatic and security part-nerships, its growing presence in countries such as Morocco and Tunisia remains largely economic and cultural. And despite the fact that China has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Libya and Tunisia, it has not yet established a formal partnership with any of the NA states [17].

China is the main trading partner of the Afri-can continent. According to China Global Investment Tracker, trade between China and the five Maghreb countries reached nearly US $ 23.5 billion in 2019. Chinese investment and contracts in the Maghreb region totaled US $ 29.6 billion between 2005 and 2019, with Algeria taking over the lion's share (US $ 23.6 billion) [98]. The Chinese are building roads, hospitals, stadiums in Africa, invest in the deve-lopment of new technologies in agriculture. On the African con-tinent, the Chinese have bought more than 3 million hectares of fertile land [5]. It is also known that almost all major mineral exploration and production contracts in the African continent fall to Chinese businessmen [21, p. 417-418].